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Abstract
The network literature commonly neglects the importance of a clear
distinction between interactions and information exchanges. Although
convenient, this oversight is not innocuous and may lead to erroneous
conclusions when looking at mechanisms such as contagion processes.
We use simulation methods and conduct a systematic analysis of the
implications of such omission. We show that the lack of distinction
between information and interaction structures is not without conse-
quences. More precisely, when agents use a myopic best response, only
information exchanges matter and interactions can be ignored. With
imitation however, both information and interactions play important
yet dierent roles in contagion.
JEL Classication C73, D85.
Keywords Contagion  Networks  Coordination games  Scale-free 
Small-worlds  Best response  Imitation
1 Introduction
A common assumption in the network literature is that a link between two
people captures both information sharing and interaction activities, where
1interaction often means playing a game. Only a few studies, such as those
by Durieu and Solal [2], Al os-Ferrer and Weidenholzer [1] consider these
two activities as distinct. The argument presented by Al os-Ferrer and Wei-
denholzer is that although interactions are predominantly local, information
sharing is often a broader activity. Hence, agents who do not play games
with each other can still gather information from one another. A conse-
quence of this assumption is that there cannot be any interaction among
strangers. However, this is not always the case in real life situations. For
example, understanding how viruses spread in a population necessitates the
acknowledgment that people do get contaminated because they did not know
the person they were interacting with was infected. The human sexual con-
tact network and the transmission of some sexually transmitted diseases
illustrates this point quite clearly. Therefore, it is primordial to capture
the fact that interactions can happen without any information transfer, or
that this information transfer happens so long after the interaction that it
becomes almost irrelevant. The assumption that people only interact with
those they know needs further study. Our aim is to investigate whether
such an assumption is innocuous in contagion processes when information
and interaction networks are distinct and potentially dierent. Specically,
in this paper we show that allowing separation between information and
interaction networks can drastically alter previous results obtained in the
contagion literature.
We are not the rst to investigate contagion processes within networks.
In his paper, Morris [6] considers an innite population of agents who are
part of an arbitrary network. A link represents both the exchange of in-
formation and the interaction that take place between two agents. Each
period, agents play a game with a nite subset of the population and choose
one of two possible actions. The game considered presents two strict Nash
equilibria. The action choice is determined by a myopic best response to
the frequency of plays in the population in the previous period. An ac-
tion is said to be contagious if it spreads to the entire population when
it is initially played by only a nite subset of agents. The main focus of
Morris' paper is to characterize, through some qualitative properties of the
network, the contagion threshold of the network, i.e. the number of agents
2needed to promote the contagion of a given action. In particular, Morris
shows that an action can only spread if it is risk dominant, as dened by
Harsanyi and Selten [4]. An extension of Morris' work by L opez-Pintado [5]
provides the exact contagion thresholds of random networks using particu-
lar connectivity distributions. Other papers such as the ones by Durieu and
Solal [2] and Al os-Ferrer and Weidenholzer [1] also study similar contagion
processes within networks. Both studies consider a game which presents
two strict Nash equilibria, one of which is either risk dominant, ecient or
both. Durieu and Solal [2] consider a nite population of agents placed on
a circle and study the contagion of the risk dominant action when agents
use best response. Al os-Ferrer and Weidenholzer [1] consider arbitrary net-
works and look at the contagion of the ecient action when agents play
imitate-the-best.
Our paper builds on Morris [6] and denes a contagion process as the
dynamics by which an action, which is initially played by only a small subset
of agents in a population, is adopted by the entire population. We consider
a nite population of agents who exchange some information and interact
with one another. The game we consider is similar to those used by Durieu
and Solal [2] and Al os-Ferrer and Weidenholzer [1] and agents use either
best response or imitate-the-best.
However, we depart from the previous literature in two ways. First,
contrary to Morris and Lopez, we make an explicit distinction between in-
teraction and information. Secondly, unlike Durieu and Solal [2] and Al os-
Ferrer and Weidenholzer [1], we look at cases where interactions take place
between agents who do not necessarily share information. In order to cap-
ture these features, we characterize two distinct networks using simulation
methods: an information network in which a link represents an exchange of
information between two agents, and an interaction network in which links
represent interactions among agents. Furthermore, we consider both best
response and imitate-the-best decision rules. The reason for considering
both rules is that one is based on frequency of plays, which is only accessed
through the information network, while the other focuses on payos, which
are determined by actual interactions as well as previous plays. Also, our
main interest diers from Morris [6] and L opez-Pintado [5] as we do not look
3at contagion thresholds, but rather we are interested in whether contagion
uses either interaction or information or both to spread. Finally, we intro-
duce small world networks as dened by Watts and Strogatz [8] in addition
to the exponential, scale-free, homogeneous and random classes of networks,
presented by L opez-Pintado [5]. As these networks are not characterized by
a particular connectivity distribution they allow us to understand whether
our results are tied with connectivity distributions or not.
We replicate the results of L opez-Pintado [5] when information and in-
teraction networks are the same and show that the separation of information
and interaction networks results in dierent outcomes. We show that infor-
mation and interactions aect contagion dierently, and that agents' be-
havior dictates which matters most. With best response, only information
matters, while with imitate-the-best, contagion spreads through both, inter-
actions and information. Furthermore, dierent classes of networks generally
produce dierent eects on contagion. More importantly, with imitation, a
given network class does not produce the same eects on contagion when
representing information relative to when representing interactions.
Although theoretical, these results have important implications in poli-
cies. Consider for example the spread of the u virus. If the population's
behavior is guided by frequencies of plays, then information campaigns may
indeed be worthwhile. On the other hand, if people are imitators, money
should not only be spent on information campaigns but also on quarantine
programs.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the networks con-
sidered, how we generate them, the game played and the behavioral rules
used by the agents. In Section 3, we show how results vary between situa-
tions where information and interaction networks are the same in contrast
to situations in which they are distinct. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a nite population of agents N = 1;2;:::;i;:::n who engage
in interaction and information sharing activities. Each agent has a set of
neighbors, with whom he shares information and a potentially dierent set
4of partners, with whom he interacts. The exchanges of information between
neighbors constitute an information network while the interactions among
partners dene an interaction network. It is possible for a neighbor to also
be a partner, and vice versa, but we are interested in situations where this
is not always the case.
Each period, agents play a 22 game with each of their partners choosing
one of two possible actions against all partners. Agent i's choice of action
depends on the information he gathers from his neighbors and his payo is
the average of the payos obtained from each of his pairwise interactions.
Once agents have played and obtained their payos, payos and actions are
updated. Then one agent is selected at random with positive probability to
revise his action ending the period.
These dynamics dene a Markov process over the set of all possible
states, where a state is a vector that species the action played by each
agent. We are interested in understanding the inuences of information and
interactions on contagion processes, i.e. the dynamics by which the Markov
process converges to a state where all agents play the same action.
2.1 Networks
In our framework, a network, whether it is an information or an interaction
network, is an undirected graph where the vertices represent the agents and
the links capture the activities between agents.
2.1.1 Interaction vs Information
In an information network, a link represents an exchange of information
between two agents, where an agent's information has two elements: the
agent's most recent action and the associated average payo. Hence, we rep-
resent an information network as an undirected graph with adjacency matrix
L, where lij = lji = 1 if there is a link between i and j and lij = 0 otherwise.
For each agent i, we dene a set of neighbors as Ni = fj 2 N s:t lij = 1 g
and we do consider agent i as being one of his own neighbors, i.e. lii = 1.
Similarly, in an interaction network, a link between two agents repre-
sents the fact that these two agents play the game together each period.
5Interactions are modeled using a graph with adjacency matrix M, where
mij = mji = 1 if there is a link between i and j and mij = 0 otherwise. Each
agent i has a set of partners that is dened as Pi = fj 6= i 2 N s:t mij = 1g.
Note that although we assume that agent i can observe his own action and
payo, we also assume that agent i does not interact with himself.
We are particularly interested in cases where information and interaction
networks are distinct as we want to disentangle the eects of information
and interactions on contagion processes. We focus our attention on ve
particular network classes: Scale-free (S.F), Exponential (Exp), Regular
(Reg), Small-World (S.W), and Random (Rnd) which characteristics are
introduced in the following section.
2.1.2 Classes of Networks
The connectivity of agent i, ki, is the number of links agent i has with
other agents. It is the number of agent i's neighbors if we consider the
information network, and it is the number of agent i's partners if we look
at the interaction network. Hence,
P(k) = 1
nCard(fi 2 N with ki = kg)
represents the connectivity distribution of a given network.
An homogeneous network, or regular graph (Reg), is one where ki is
exactly k for all i. An exponential network (Exp) presents a connectivity
distribution that peaks at an average < k > and decays exponentially for
large k:
PExp(k)  ek
A scale-free network (S.F) has a connectivity distribution
PSF(k)  k 
with  usually between 2 and 3. This allows some nodes to have very
high connectivity.
Small-world networks (S.W) of Watts and Strogatz [8] are not charac-
terized by their connectivity distribution but rather by their overall path-
length and their clustering coecient. The overall path length is the average
6number of hops between one node and every other node. The clustering co-
ecient is the proportion of an agent's neighbors who are also neighbors
with one another in the information network. A similar denition applies to
the interactions network. The characteristics of small-world networks is that
they have a small average path length and a high clustering coecient, com-
pared to a Erd~ os and R eniyi (Bernouilli) random graph [3] with the same
number of nodes and equivalent average degree of connectivity. A Erd~ os and
R eniyi random graph [3] is one where the presence of an edge [or not] from
the 2n(n 1) edges is given by a global parameter p [resp. (1-p)], and hence
these do not follow any particular connectivity distribution either. The in-
tegration of small world and random networks (Rnd) in our study allows
us to understand whether our results are fundamentally linked with specic
forms of connectivity distributions. Figure 1 below is an illustration of the
type of networks considered in this study.
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Figure 1: Example networks studied in this paper: a) Scale-free; b) Expo-
nential; c) Homogeneous; d) Small-world; and e) Random.
The fact that small-world and random networks are not characterized
by their connectivity distribution implies that it is possible for example to
have a small-world network that has a scale-free distribution, or a scale-free
network that has the characteristics of a small-world. If this happens too
7often, there will be no dierence in our results between scale-free networks
and small-worlds. To avoid this and other very peculiar cases, for each trial
and each class of network, we picked one network among the ten networks
we generated. This minimizes the likelihood of generating only scale-free
small-worlds and eliminates the risk of getting results for a very peculiar set
of networks.
Scale-free and exponential networks are built following the algorithm
proposed by Newman et al. [7]. Log-likelihood tests of the resultant power-
law degree distribution generated  as given1, and L =  11:5 (xmin = 4).
The exponential distribution was tested with a standard transformed OLS
procedure with  as given, t statistic 30.9 and R2 = 0:98. Homogeneous,
small-world and random graphs are built following the local wiring approach
as in Watts and Strogatz [8]. A rewiring probability of 1 was used to produce
each random network.
All the graphs we generate are connected, i.e. there is always a sequence
of links from one agent to any another agent. This avoids the absence
of contagion due to isolated nodes in either networks. Furthermore, we
compare contagion processes among graphs with similar average degrees to
avoid unwanted network eects. More specically, we adopt information and
interaction networks with similar average degree in all of our experiments,
and in all our regression. Hence, in all our tables, the variable hki applies
to both networks.
Table 4 presented in the Appendix section summarizes the characteris-
tics of the graph database used in our experiments. Each graph type was
represented by 10 distinct networks and each graph comprised 100 agents
and was tested to ensure connectedness. The mean hki, the clustering coef-
cient hCi, and the average degree path length hLi are reported for pooled
data from all 10 networks for a given type (standard deviations given in
parenthesis).
Figure 2, presented below, is an illustration of the characteristics of the
network database that has been used in one of the trials. Each point repre-
sents the mean of all 10 networks in a given network class/degree database
cohort. The horizontal axis represents the four possible values of the average
1See table 5 in Appendix for values of 
8degree of connectivity hki which are 4, 6, 8 and 12, while the vertical axis
captures the standard deviation of hki in the rst graph, the average path
length in the second graph and the average clustering coecient in the third
graph. As the gure illustrates, the ve network classes chosen give rise to
highly varied network characteristics.






























Figure 2: Example of the characteristics of a network database with average
degree hki of 4, 6, 8 and 12.
2.2 Dynamics of the Game
Each period, each agent interacts with each of their partners and chooses
an action from the space S = f0;1g. Payos from each pairwise interaction





where d > f and b > e so that the game is a coordination game with two
strict Nash Equilibrium (0;0) and (1;1).
Let q = b e
d f+b e be the probability associated with playing 1 in the
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. If q  1=2, then action 1 is said to be risk
dominant as dened by Harsanyi and Selten [4]. The lower the value of q,
the more risk dominant action 1 is. Player i's payo i at the end of the
period is the average of his pairwise interactions' payos:
9i = 1
Card(Pi) 1j2Pi(si;sj)
where (si;sj) can be read in the above matrix and si, sj 2 S = f0;1g.
2.3 Behavioral Rules
We assume that agents use either one of two common decision rules: myopic
best response (BR) and imitate-the-best (IM). The choice of these rules
is motivated by the fundamental dierences that exist between them. BR
focuses on frequency of plays while IM focuses on payos. Hence, BR gives
more importance to information than interactions, as what matters for an
agent's decision is the frequency of plays within his neighborhood, and hence,
whoever interacts with whom is irrelevant. For IM, interactions do matter
as they determine the payos, but the decision regarding which action to
play is still made through the observation of the payos. Hence, with IM, it
is not clear which matters most between the information and the interaction
networks.
Furthermore, we do not consider any mixing of the two rules within the
population, i.e. for any given experiment, all agents follow the same rule.
This allows us to highlight why, when a decision rule is based on frequency
of actions rather than payos (and vice versa), it is vital to correctly specify
and separate the information network from the interaction network.
We study the contagion of action 1, the risk dominant action, as con-
tagion of action 0 cannot occur with BR as demonstrated by Morris [6].
Hence, the starting state contains only a very small fraction of agents play-
ing 1. When agents use IM, we had to increase the proportion of agents
playing 1 at the start of the game in order to obtain sucient contagion
events to enable data analysis. This does not aect our results in any way,
as we will explain later.
For BR, we assume that all agents react to the distribution of plays
within their neighborhood. In our case, it means that player i chooses
1 if he observes that the proportion of his neighbors playing 1, excluding
himself, is higher than q. The reason why we exclude agent i from the
sample is because when using BR, player i samples from others to see what
he will likely encounter. He then makes his response to the rest of the world
10appropriately. Since his own play is being changed subject to others, it is
non-sensical for him to include himself.
If agent i plays using IM, he chooses the action that gave him or his
neighbors the highest payo in the previous period. In this case, we assume
that player i includes his own past experience in his decision. He samples
from his neighbors because he considers that what they have experienced
(i.e. their payos) could be a good proxy for what he is likely to experience.
If his neighbors experienced a higher payo than himself, then he rightly
tries out their action.
2.4 Example
This example illustrates the dynamics of the game, the adjustment processes
and the importance of the distinction between information and interaction
networks. Consider a population of ve agents: A, B, C, D and E. The in-
formation ows (plain links) and interactions (dashed links) between these
agents are presented in Figure 3. For clarity purposes, none of the informa-
tion links from one agent to himself has been drawn. The potential pairwise
payos are given by the following values of the payo matrix: b = 1, d = 5
and e = f = 0.
Assume that in period 1 the choice of actions is: sA = sB = sE = f1g
and sC = sD = f0g. Then, the payos are: A = B = E = 0 and
D = C = 1=3. Assume agent E is now selected to revise his action. If
all agents use BR, then agent E keeps playing action 1 in period 2 as he
observes that half of his neighbors played action 1 in the previous period
(and 1=2 > 1=6 which is the value of q in the game considered). On the
other hand, if agents use IM, then agent E switches from action 1 to action 0
in period 2, as the highest payo obtained by agent E's neighbors (including
himself) is associated with action 0.
Suppose now that agents will be selected to revise their strategies in the
following order during the next periods: A then B, C and D. This means
that in period 2, agent E revises his action, payos are updated, and agent
A is selected to revise his action next period. In period 3, agent A chooses
his action, payos are updated and agent B is selected to revise his action
11next period, and so on.
Case 1: All agents use BR. The payos in period 2 are then the same
as in period 1. Moving to period 3 and 4, agents A and then B will keep
playing action 1 (as they observe that all their neighbors played action 1 in
the previous period) and thus payos will be unchanged. In period 5, agent
C will switch to action 1, and the payos will be A = D = 0, B = 5,
C = 10=3 and E = 5=2. In period 6, agent D will switch to action 1, and
thus all players will play action 1 from period 6 on.
Case 2: All agents use IM. In period 2, since agent E switches his action
to 0, payos are A = B = 0, E = 1 and C = D = 2=3. These payos
will convince agent A then B to switch to strategy 0, and hence all agents




Figure 3: Information (plain) and Interaction (dashed) Networks
Case 1 and Case 2 represent the actual dynamics among the ve agents
when they use BR or IM. We now investigate what happens if no careful
distinction is made between interactions and information.
In order to do that, we consider three possible scenarios. The rst sce-
nario is when only information ows are observed, and we assume that
interactions can be represented by the same links. The second scenario is
when only interactions are observed, and information exchanges are thought
of as following the same links. Finally, the last scenario is when no clear
distinction is made between information and interaction, and any link be-
tween two agents is considered to be both, an information exchange and an
interaction.
12Scenario 1: Only information links are observed, and it is assumed that
interaction links are the same. In this case, plain links are considered to
be both: information ows and interactions. Hence in period 1, where
sA = sB = sE = f1g and sC = sD = f0g, we have A = B = 5, E = 5=2,
D = C = 1=2. If agent E is selected to revise his action, whether agents
use IM or BR does not matter as agent E will select action 1 in any case.
Therefore, agent A then B in the next periods will not change their action
either, no matter which decision rule is used, while agent C then D will
switch to action 1 when given the opportunity, thus leading the contagion
of action 1.
Scenario 2: Only interactions are observed, and it is assumed that in-
formation links are the same. In this case, dashed links are considered
to be both: information ows and interactions. Hence in period 1, where
sA = sB = sE = f1g and sC = sD = f0g, we have A = B = E = 0, and
D = C = 1=3. If agent E is selected to revise his action, the decision rule
used does not matter as agent E will select action 0 in any case. Agent A
then B will do the same thereafter, no matter the decision rule, and hence
all agents will play action 0 from period 4 on.
Scenario 3: No clear distinction is made between information and inter-
action. In this case, any link, whether plain or dashed, is considered to be
both: information ow and interaction. When two links exist between two
agents, one for information the other for interaction, only one link is consid-
ered and it represents both activities. In this case, looking at period 1, where
sA = sB = sE = f1g and sC = sD = f0g, we now have A = B = 10=3,
D = C = 1=3 and E = 5=2. If agent E is selected to revise his action,
the decision rule does not matter as agent E will choose action 1 again in
period 2, whether agents use BR or IM. Therefore, agent A then B will not
change their action when given the opportunity to do so, while agent C and
then agent D will switch to action 1 when possible. In this case, there will
be contagion of action 1.
No matter the decision rule used, Scenario 1 and Scenario 3 predict
contagion of action 1 while Scenario 2 predicts the contagion of action 0.
These results show that undermining the distinction between information
and interactions can lead to predictions that may or may not coincide with
13the 'reality' presented in Case 1 and Case 2.
3 Numerical Results
In all experiments (except where stated) n = 100 and 500 repetitions (tri-
als) of each experiment were conducted.2 The information and interaction
networks were initialized in one of three ways depending on the experiment:
1. Same Network: A single (uniform random) selection of a network
from a given network class database and this network was used as both
the information and interaction network (i.e. setting both networks to
be identical); or
2. Same Class: Independent draws (with replacement) were made from
a single network class database for each of the information and inter-
action networks3; or
3. Dierent Class: Independent draws (with replacement) were made
from two dierent network class databases for each of the information
and interaction networks.
Exploratory trials were run (100 trials, 500 updates) for S.F networks us-
ing the Same Network case to determine what fraction of the agents should
be initialized with action 1 under each decision rule. These trials indicated
that convergence probabilities were both non-zero and non-unity for initial-
ization at the rate of 2% and 5% for BR and IM respectively.4 Thus, these
fractions are used throughout the results.5
The two-player game considered in the results used values of d = 5, b = 1,
e = f = 0, and hence, q = 1
6 and the outcome of the action prole (1;1)
was risk dominant and ecient. Results are similar for dierent games, as
2Experiments were conducted with 1,000 and 10,000 repetitions in the early stages but
yielded insignicant variation in results to justify the additional computational cost. See
Figure 11 in Appendix for more details.
3Note, this includes the former case (Same network) since it is possible that a specic
network is chosen (twice) to be the information and interaction network. However, this
occurs in only 1% of cases, or around 5 in 500 trials on average.
4See Figure 12 in Appendix for details.
5Since we only compare results within decision rules the initialization choices are in-
consequential to our ndings.
14long as q  1
2 and the equilibrium is risk dominant and ecient.6 When the
game considered presents a risk dominant equilibrium which is not ecient,
the results are identical for BR, but dier with IM. This is due to the fact
that imitation favors the ecient action (action 0), and hence, contagion of
action 1 is unlikely to occur.
3.1 Frequency of contagion
The results presented below start with the most common case found in the
previous literature, Same Network, to provide a base-line for comparison.
Next, the two extensions to this case, the Same Class, and Dierent Class
regimes are studied.
3.1.1 Same Networks: Identical information and interaction net-
works
When information and interaction networks are identical, the percentage
of networks for which contagion is obtained depends on the network class
as well as the average degree of connectivity, as shown in Table 1 below.
Generally, the lower the average degree of connectivity, the higher the prob-
ability of contagion. Hence, contagion is enhanced by low connectivity and
constrained by high connectivity, irrespective of network type or decision
rule. This can be intuitively understood by the fact that a higher degree of
connectivity means a higher number of neighbors/partners on average and
thus, a higher proportion of neighbors/partners need to adopt action 1 in
order for contagion to occur.
Also, note that as illustrated by Figures 4 and 5 below, the relation
between hki and the probability of contagion is highly non-linear. More-
over, for both decision rules, the relative ranking of the network structures
in terms of probability of contagion is extremely volatile and depends on
the average connectivity. Therefore, network classes cannot be consistently
ranked by contagion probability.
Finally, recall that the relative values between BR and IM do not matter
6Simulation results for games with dierent parameter values are available from the
authors upon request.
15as initial conditions dier.
Table 1: Probabilities of contagion for the Same Network regime.
Best Response Imitate-the-best
< k > < k >
Graph 4 6 8 12 4 6 8 12
S.F 63.6 61.0 38.4 0.4 29.2 33.0 34.0 7.2
Exp 62.4 33.6 11.8 1.2 28.8 24.8 18.0 14.0
Reg 96.0 6.4 10.8 0.0 33.6 40.8 10.6 1.6
S.W 95.4 15.4 9.6 1.2 33.6 33.0 8.2 3.6
Rnd 80.4 68.6 14.2 1.2 30.0 29.0 15.0 7.2























Figure 4: Contagion probabilities under BR decision rule and Same Net-
work regime. Each point represents the fraction of 500 trials which saw the
whole population adopt action 1.























Figure 5: Contagion probabilities under IM decision rule and Same Net-
work regime. See Fig. 4 and text for details.
3.1.2 Dierent networks: Distinct information and interaction
networks
Table 2 and Table 3 below illustrate how the contagion probabilities evolve
under each decision rule when the interaction and information graphs are not
identical. The results presented here specically address two cases. First,
the Same Class regime (panel a), where both interaction and information
graphs are drawn from the same network class database, but are not neces-
sarily the same graph. Second, the Dierent Class regime, where in a rst
instance, the interaction network is chosen from the S.F database, whilst the
information graph varies according to the given row (panel b). Then the
information network is chosen from the S.F database, whilst the interaction
graph varies according to the given row (panel c). In either case, we refer
to the S.F class as the reference class.7
Similarities exist with the Same Network regime: the probability of con-
tagion decreases with the average degree of connectivity and the contagion
probability ranking is inconsistent under varying connectivity. Similarly,
the link between hki and the probability of contagion is highly non-linear,
7Simulations for other reference classes provide similar results and are available upon
request from the authors
17Table 2: Probabilities of contagion for the Same Class regime.
Best Response Imitate-the-best
< k > < k >
Graph 4 6 8 12 4 6 8 12
S.F. 60.8 61.8 40.0 1.2 15.2 17.0 14.8 3.6
Exp 70.2 33.8 9.2 1.8 13.4 12.8 10.2 9.4
Reg 83.4 0.8 9.2 1.8 28.6 33.0 8.2 2.0
S.W. 91.4 4.0 9.6 1.0 32.4 29.6 6.8 2.0
Rnd 79.0 66.4 11.6 0.2 17.4 13.4 6.6 2.2
as illustrated by Figures 6 and 7 below. These observations are valid for
both decision rules, BR and IM.
Table 3: Probabilities of contagion for the Dierent Class regime, with
S.F as the reference class.
Int = S.F Inf = S.F
Best response
< k > < k >
Graph 4 6 8 12 4 6 8 12
Exp 68.8 33.4 11.0 1.0 64.0 62.0 40.2 0.6
Reg 87.0 1.2 8.0 0.0 63.8 60.0 39.4 0.6
S.W 92.8 2.4 11.2 0.8 58.6 63.2 40.6 0.0
Rnd 81.4 66.8 15.6 0.4 61.2 56.8 40.2 1.4
Imitate-the-best
< k > < k >
Graph 4 6 8 12 4 6 8 12
Exp 11.0 14.6 17.6 3.6 9.2 12.2 11.8 11.0
Reg 2.2 9.6 8.8 2.6 24.8 3.4 4.8 1.0
S.W 4.4 12.6 9.8 2.0 29.4 2.2 5.2 1.6
Rnd 10.8 18.4 17.0 2.4 18.0 12.4 6.0 3.0
Comparing to the baseline, Same Network regime (Table 1 left panel
and Fig. 4) with Same Class regime (Table 2 left panel and Figure 6.a), it
is clear that BR is robust to a violation of the Same Network assumption.
Furthermore, as can be inferred from panels b and c in Figure 6, the BR
case is dominated heavily by the class from which the information network
is drawn: when the information network is sampled from the S.F class and




































Figure 6: Contagion probabilities under BR decision rule and: a) Same
Class regime; b) Interaction drawn from S.F class, Information network
type varying; and c) Information drawn from S.F class, interaction network
type varying. Each point represents mean probability of contagion to action
1 of 500 trials.




































Figure 7: Contagion probabilities under IM decision rule. See caption to
Fig. 6 for details.
19the interaction network varies (panel c) the contagion probability remains
dened by the S.F information network alone.
However, under IM, both the interaction and information networks make
non-trivial and non-intuitive contributions to the contagion probability. No-
tably, although in the Same Network regime, all ve network classes followed
a broadly similar pattern, in the Same Class regime there appears roughly
to be two sub-classes of behavior with the `structured' networks (Reg and
S.W) classes on the one hand, and the statistical networks (S.F, Exp, and
Rnd) on the other. Most interestingly, the fact that with BR the informa-
tion network class is dominant in determining contagion, is not a feature of
the IM data. Indeed, it would appear from Figures 7.b and 7.c that both
the information and interaction networks contribute to the relative spread
of action 1 under IM. Furthermore, it seems that at least for the S.F inter-
action network class case (Fig. 7.b), there is some optimimum level of hki
for contagion.
To quantitatively understand the relative contributions of each network
class to these results probit estimations were conducted as detailed in the
next section.
3.2 Network Changes Marginal Eects and Contagion
The probit model was constructed and estimated as follows. Dene CONVi
to take the value 1 if the entire population adopted action 1 in some trial i,
Ki to be the nominal connectivity (average network degree) of the networks
in the trial8, Xi to be a vector of interaction and information dummies
taking the value 1 if the given network class is being used, and 0 otherwise
with one network class being retained as the omitted variable, and  to be
an error term, then we have,
CONVi = 0 + 1Ki + B:Xi + i : (1)
8Here we distinguish from hki which is the actual average degree of a given network.
We do not use both values of hki for each network (information and interaction) for a
given trial since for all trials these are essentially equal to the nominal value K and so
would represent highly correlated regressors.
20Since we are dealing with ve network classes for each of the interaction
and information networks in each trial, and two dierent decision rules, we
conduct a total of 10 probit estimations.
The complete table with the estimation results is presented in Table 6
of the Appendix section. Each column illustrates how a variation from a
particular type of information or interaction network can aect the conta-
gion process. For example, the rst column (`BR/SF') gives the estimated
coecients for BR data, where the SF interaction and information networks
are the omitted network class. Hence, the dummy vector Xi includes the
four remaining network class dummies for each of the information and in-
teraction network classes (8 dummies in all). The coecients can thus be
read as changes to the probability of convergence when the interaction or
information network is varied from a base case of each being drawn from the
S.F class. Subsequent columns can be read in an identical manner, with a
dierent base (omitted) class used.
One can easily see that under BR, the inuence of the interaction network
on the contagion process is never signicant, while any variation in the
information network induces a variation in the probability of contagion. The
only exception to this rule occurs when one switches between a random and
a scale free information network. This may be caused by dierences that are
too subtle between these two types of networks. We can nonetheless safely
conclude that with BR, information leads contagion.
This distinction between information and interaction and its implications
on contagion is not as clear with IM. In this case, both networks matter and
the eects of switching from one network class to another dier depending
on which network, information or interaction, is considered. For example,
switching between Rnd and Reg information networks has quite a signicant
impact on the probability of contagion while the same switch of the interac-
tion network generates no eect. Hence, whether agents use BR or IM, the
utmost care should be taken in dierentiating information and interaction
networks.
213.2.1 Join Tests
Next, we conduct some join tests on the coecients related to the class of
the information and interaction networks. We make a comparison between
our estimated probit model, and a linearly restricted case where we restrict
all the coecients of the INT variables to be equal to zero. The same test
is then realized with all INF variables equal to zero.
For BR, we nd a chi-square value of 4.5654 which is not signicant when
testing for the interaction networks coecients, and a value of 1761.1 for the
information networks, which is signicant at 1 percent. This conrms the
absence of role played by the interaction network in contagion.
When considering IM however, both chi-square values are signicant at 1
percent, with 141.33 for the INT variables and 24.641 for the INF variables.
This validates the fact that both networks, interaction and information, play
some role in the contagion process.
3.2.2 Marginal Eects
We now go further in our analysis by computing the marginal changes of
the probability of contagion due to a variation in the network class. Results
for marginal eects are illustrated below for each decision rule by Figures
8 and 9. Two stars reect a signicance of the eect at one percent and
one star at 5 percent. The rst rectangle represent the marginal eects of
varying the interaction network (on the left of the vertical dotted line) or the
information network (on the right of the dotted line) from S.F to another
class.
For BR, only the information network matters for contagion, as sup-
ported by the join test results and conrmed by Figure 8. Furthermore, the
most signicant impact on the probability of contagion when changing the
information network class arises when there is a switch between S.F or Rnd
and S.W, Reg or Exp. The sign of the change is positive if the base case is

































Figure 8: Marginal Changes in contagion probabilities under BR when vary-
ing network class
We now present our main results for BR:
Result 1 Under BR, contagion probability is controlled by the information
network's class alone.
23Consequently, the class of the interaction network is irrelevant, and
hence, the general results for the Same Network, Same Class and Dier-
ent Class regimes are equivalent, provided that the information network is
drawn from the same class for all regimes.
Corollary 1 Under BR, all regimes are equivalent for a given information
network's class.
The intuitions for Result 1 are relatively straightforward. Recall that for BR,
an agent's update decision is suciently informed by the action prole of her
information partners alone, the actual performance of a given action (in the
interaction network) is irrelevant to this calculus; only the exogenously set
payo schedule is of use to identify the optimizing agent's best response. In
this sense, the actual interaction neighborhood is irrelevant to the decision.
This means that in the example presented in subsection 2.4, predictions
made in Case 1 and Scenario 1 coincide.
For IM, the eects are more diuse. Three trends can nonetheless be
extracted from the marginal eects presented in Figure 9. First, the varia-
tion of the information network from one class to another does not have the
same eect on the probability of contagion than the same class variation of
the interaction network. Second, any shift of the interaction network from
either an Exp or a Rnd network induces a positive marginal change of the
probability of contagion. Third, the largest positive marginal changes in the
probability of contagion are observed when there is a shift of the interaction
network away from the Rnd network class. These observations corroborate
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Figure 9: Marginal Changes in contagion probabilities under IM when vary-
ing network class
We now state our main result for IM:
Result 2 Under IM, contagion probability is controlled by both, the infor-
mation and the interaction networks. However, a given network class does
25not produce the same eects on contagion when representing information
relative to when representing interactions.
Back to our example presented above in subsection 2.4, this means that
predictions made under Case 2 are the only valid predictions. Any similar-
ities between the predictions obtained under Case 2 and any other scenario
or Case 1 should be seen as coincidental.
3.2.3 Average degree of distribution
Finally, we isolate and measure the marginal eects at means of a change
in the average degree of distribution on the probability of contagion. In
order to do that, we use the estimated coecients of the probit model and
estimate the probability of contagion when every variable other than hki is
held constant at a mean value of 0.2. This is the mean value of all dummy
variables as there are ve network classes and the value of each variable can
take on the value of 0 or 1. The changes of hki from 4 to 6 then 8 and 12 are
illustrated below by Figure 10. We nd that under both, BR and IM, an
increase in the average degree connectivity of either network, information or
interaction, induces a negative marginal eect at means on the probability
of contagion.






































Figure 10: Marginal changes at means in contagion probabilities when hki
varies
This last observation conrms clearly earlier observations regarding the
26link between connectivity and contagion.
4 Conclusions
Our study provides valuable insights as to which of information or inter-
actions matter most in contagion processes. It also highlights the intricate
dependence between behavioral rules and networks.
If agents focus on the frequency of plays as they do with BR, only infor-
mation matters. The eects on contagion will then be of dierent magnitude
and direction depending on the information network class. On the other
hand, if agents make decisions based on payos levels, contagion spreads
through both, information and interactions. In this case, the magnitude
and direction of the network eects on contagion not only depend on the
network class but also on whether the network represents information or
interactions. This is because the eects of a given network representing
information do not always coincide with the eects induced by the same
network when representing interactions.
These results are important as they underline why, by loosely dening
links between agents, results may be inaccurate. It also highlights why it
is crucial to understand whether a population behave according to frequen-
cies of plays or outcomes levels. Back to our initial example regarding the
spread of viruses or sexually transmitted diseases, these results present some
signicant implications for policies. If people rely on frequencies of plays,
informing them is worthwhile as it will shape their decision on whether to
protect themselves. On the other hand, if people are imitators, further inter-
vention on interactions is needed to avoid the contagion of risky behaviors.
Therefore, when studying real life networks, utmost care should be given to
the nature of the networks (information or interactions), their class and the
behavior of agents.
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285 Appendix
Table 4: Characteristics of the graph database used in this paper
4 6 8 12
S.F
hki 3.90 5.82 7.57 12.41
(3.76) (4.60) (5.13) (6.75)
hCi 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.21
hLi 3.02 2.61 2.40 2.06
Exp
hki 4.01 5.95 7.97 12.15
(3.27) (5.67) (8.50) (13.10)
hCi 0.08 0.19 0.36 0.62
hLi 3.21 2.65 2.38 2.11
Reg
hki 4.00 6.00 8.00 12.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
hCi 0.50 0.59 0.64 0.68
hLi 12.89 8.76 6.70 4.64
S.W
hki 4.00 6.00 8.00 12.00
(0.19) (0.25) (0.25) (0.32)
hCi 0.48 0.58 0.62 0.66
hLi 10.19 6.49 5.18 3.49
Rnd
hki 3.99 5.92 7.84 11.68
(1.45) (1.80) (2.10) (2.62)
hCi 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.12
hLi 3.45 2.75 2.43 2.10
29Table 5: Values of alpha for generated Exp and S.F network classes
k = 4 6 8 12
Values of  for S.F
2.5 2.58 2.65 2.78
Values of  for Exp
-0.2215 -0.1527 -0.0999 -0.0663






















Figure 11: Example results from a trial where interaction and information
networks are identical (Same Network). Each line represents a single trial




















































Figure 12: Initialization Trials for BR (left) and IM (right)
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